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BOOK REVIEWS
Rich Schools, Poor Schools: The Promise of Equal Educational Op.
portunity. ARTHUR E. WISE. Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press. 1968. Pp. xiv, 228. $9.00; and
The Quality of Inequality: Urban and Suburban Public Schools.
CHARLEs U. DALY (Eim.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1968. Pp. 160. $2.45.
"Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined."1
Almost nobody really wants to make America an egalitarian society.
Ours is a competitive society, in which some people do extremely
well and others do equally badly, and most people are willing to
keep it that way. . . . [D]espite a lot of pious rhetoric about
equality of opportunity in this competition, most parents want
their children to have a more than equal chance of success.2
Of all the wounds that fester in urban areas throughout the
United States, none surpasses the inability of big city school systems
to prepare minority-group youngsters for the battle of life. A dis-
proportionate number of minority-group youths do not succeed in
life, in part because our urban schools are not educating them ad-
equately-a fact reflected by inferior achievement test scores and
high dropout rates.3 The imposition of a disadvantaged educational
position on Negroes and other minority groups is hypocritical and
debilitating, for the schools are traditionally thought to be the vehi-
cle for social and economic mobility for the poor. One who obtains
an adequate education can cast the ballot rationally and responsibly.
Perhaps equally important, the substantial inequities of life encoun-
tered by the individual are countenanced more readily if the condi-
tions for competition are established fairly.4
I Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
in The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 H, v. L. REv. 91 (1966).
2 Jencks, Is the Public School Obsolete?, Tm PuB. INTEMRsT, Winter 1966, at 18, 20.
3 See K. CLAm, DARKc GHsTro 124-25 (2d ed. 1967); cf. HEW, EQuALrry oF EouC,-
TIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN REPORT].
4 The importance of education was recognized by the Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where it said:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child
to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
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The struggle to remedy the failure of urban education has fo-
cused on two problems. Concentration on the first, racial segregation,
produced an attempt to implement Brown v. Board of Education's
admonition against "separate but equal" schools. This approach was
unsuccessful, however, in part because in the North segregation is
de facto rather than de jure.5 The second problem, with which the
two books reviewed here are primarily concerned, is that public ex-
penditure per pupil varies substantially from one school district to
another. Inequality in school resources is not a purely urban problem.
Rather, because most school districts are heavily dependent upon the
local property tax to finance education, 6 it affects every district that is
comparatively poor in real estate. The happenstance of whether a
large factory is located inside the school district boundaries gives that
district a significant financial advantage over its neighbors, and this
phenomenon is not restricted to the cities. Nonetheless, disparities in
educational resources are particularly troublesome in the cities, since
an urban school board requires far more resources to adequately edu-
cate its disadvantaged, culturally deprived youngsters and yet receives
less money than the more affluent suburban boards with their white,
well-to-do residents.
The problems of the ghetto are more substantial than those of
the suburbs; it is in the urban areas that one finds the "social dyna-
mite," of which James Conant forewarned us,7 building up. One
would think that a society responsive to injustice would allocate
more resources to that sector. Yet such reallocation is not taking
place nor, politically speaking, does it seem to be in the cards. Do
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
5 Cf. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
924 (1964). Contra, Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board of Educ.,
226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on rehearing, 229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). Some of the better law
review discussions of the de facto issue are Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAV. L. REv. 564 (1965); Wright, Public School Desegre-
gation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 285 (1965). For an ex-
tensive analysis see U.S. CoMas'N ON CIVIL RimI-TS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1967). See also United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
6 See, e.g., Grant, Public Schools Feel the Money Pinch, CoMaMONWuEAL, Apr. 25, 1969,
at 167.
7t See J. CONANT, SLUMS AND SUBURBS (1961).
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disparities in school district expenditures for education present con-
stitutional violations appropriately remedied by the judiciary? The
question is still an open one, almost as free from precedent as the
de facto segregation issue.8 Rich Schools, Poor Schools seems gener-
ally sympathetic to the notion that present school finance law offends
the Constitution. But Professor Kurland, a long-time critic of the
Court's constitutional behavior,9 answers the question negatively in
The Quality of Inequality: Urban and Suburban Public Schools.10
I
The constitutional attack on school finance law in Rich Schools,
Poor Schools is derived from the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment." In the reapportionment cases,12  where the
Court enjoined any dilution of the citizen's right to vote, the prop-
osition that one's right to vote cannot depend upon the geographical
section of the state in which he resides was established. Although
one might argue persuasively that schemes other than the "one man,
one vote" approach are rationally related to the viability of the dem-
ocratic process, the ,Court has endorsed a strict standard of review
where a crucial right, such as the vote, is involved. Is it then possi-
8 But see McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). See also Horowitz and Neitring,
Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Pro-
grams from Place to Place within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. RPv. 787 (1968); Horowitz, Un-
separate But Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School
Education, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1147 (1966); Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Pro-
tection, 38 HA'v. EDUC. Rav. 635 (1968); Address by Zwerdling, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n 12th Nat'l
Conf. on School Finance, Mar. 24, 1969; Note, Hobson v. Hansen: Judicial Supervision of
the Color-Blind School Board, 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1511 (1968). There is precedent for a
judicial examination of the adequacy of school resources in the pre-Brown segregation
cases. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Fainter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950).
9 See, e.g., Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legisla-
tive and Executive Branches of the Government," in The Supreme Court, 1963 Term,
78 HA v. L. REV. 143 (1964).
1o Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity or The Limits of Constitutional Juris-
prudence Undefined, in THE QUALITY oF INEQUALrrY: UR3AN AND SUBURBAN PUBLIC Scoo] s
47 (C. Daly ed. 1968).
11 No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
12 Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ble to dilute the quality of education received because the resident
lives in a particular area of the state?
The second part of the constitutional attack is grounded in
Harper v. Board of Elections's and Griffin v. Illinois.14 In Harper
the Supreme Court held the poll tax incompatible with the require-
ments of equal protection. Said the Court:
Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race .. .are tradi-
tionally disfavored .... To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as
a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a capricious or
irrelevant factor. The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.15
In Griffin, relied upon in Harper, it was held that a stenographic
transcript from a criminal trial, available to defendants for appeal
purposes, must be provided to an indigent defendant without cost.
Thus both Griffin and Harper make clear that the Court will not
tolerate, in the electoral and criminal processes, discrimination that
makes their exercise depend upon the amount of money that a man
possesses.
Two features of Harper and Griffin are significant. The first
is their articulation of the Court's view that improper legislative
motivation, or hostility toward a particular race or class, is not a
prerequisite for finding a constitutional violation. Judges are to focus
upon the effect of the particular practice and not its origin. The
second is the Court's constitutional definition of discrimination. In
Griffin-and to some extent in Harper-an individual is not re-
quired to pay the cost of the service performed. This is because
"the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship
to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as an
excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."'' 6 The state-or at
least that particular arm of the state involved in the criminal pro-
ceedings-was not shown to have caused or contributed to the defen-
dant's economic plight. Nevertheless, the Court imposed an affirmative
obligation upon the state to remedy the individual's disadvantage
when he comes into contact with a public institution and the con-
sequences of the contact are serious for him.17
Is 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Cf. Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969);
Gould, Book Review, COMMONWEAL, Apr. 25, 1969, at 176.
14 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
15 383 U.S. at 668.
16 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
17 It is interesting to note that most states provide special benefits for the physically




Whether these cases imply that inequality in school finances vi-
olates equal protection depends initially upon whether education,
like voting and the criminal process, is a critical personal right
where a disproportionately heavy burden upon Negroes and the poor
is constitutionally suspect."'
In American life today there is little more essential to the indi-
vidual and society than education, and the Court has emphasized
the importance of education and its availability on equal terms in
both Brown and Griffin v. County School Board.19 If the state pro-
vides effective education, other critical personal rights are served.
Presumably, the vote is used more intelligently and contact with
the criminal process should be less frequent. Moreover, the Court
has shown sensitivity to racial classifications having a discrimina-
tory impact. One cannot separate the racial implications of school
finance legislation that penalizes impoverished school districts from
the purely economic implications of the system; although a majority
of the poor are white, existing school finance legislation harms Ne-
groes proportionately to a much greater extent than whites. School
finance law discriminates against both the poor as an economic class
and Negroes as a race.
But does the amount of expenditure have anything to do with
the quality of education that the student receives? This is one of
two large hurdles that must be jumped by future plaintiffs. The
Coleman Report20 concludes that educational performance is attrib-
utable to socio-economic class and not the resources that are made
available by financing, for example, libraries and curricula. The data
relied upon by this study are under attack from some quarters.21 But
in any case, one glaring exception to the Coleman Report's judgment,
by its own admission, is that the quality of teachers has something
to do with achievement,22 and that good teachers cost money.
state may not have intentionally, or at least affirmatively, caused the discrimination suf-
fered by poor school districts and their students, sodety would seem to have a greater
duty to them than to the physically handicapped. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). For a comprehensive approach to shifting the responsibility of education to the
state and away from the local property tax, see REPoRT or TE GoVwmoR's CoaMSSION
oN EDUCATIONAL RPFxom (1969); N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
18 See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff"d sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
19 377 US. 218 (1964).
20 See note 3 supra.
21 See S. BowLEs & H. LEviN, TnE DET NTs or SCHOLAsTic ACHIEVEMMT: AN
APPRAISAL OF SoME RECENT EvID.NcE (1968).
22 COLEmAN REPoRT at 22, 125, 130-41, 147.
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Another formidable obstacle is the practicability of the remedy.
In this connection, it is appropriate to consider the criteria that
Professor Kurland regards as prerequisites to success in equal pro-
tection clause cases: (1) the constitutional standard to be followed
must be simple; (2) the judgment must have an adequate means of
enforcement; and (3) there must be an absence of great public oppo-
sition or, at least, public acquiescence. 2 These criteria may account
for the small amount of integration that has taken place since Brown;
24
although integration is a relatively clear standard, the other two cri-
teria do not appear to be met in that field.
In the area of school finance, one encounters problems on all
three counts. Since absolute equality in per-pupil expenditures does
not meet the needs of urban ghettos, the constitutional standard must
be more fluid and difficult of judicial supervision than were the stan-
dards in the integration or reapportionment cases. Perhaps it is this
that leads Mr. Wise to suggest that the remedy ought to be a rough
dollar equity.25 Yet dearly that will not do. Nothing less than a
complete reversal in spending priorities will have any chance of rem-
edying the disadvantages suffered by the ghetto youngster because
of his early environment. The affluent have the advantages and accor-
dingly require less assistance.
The relatively well-to-do, white, suburban districts-although
many find themselves in increasing financial difficulty-will not,
however, willingly yield their preferred position or any portion of
the advantage which they now hold. Even though tensions in our
inner cities threaten the entire community, the wealthy districts wish
their students to have more than an equal chance. There must,
therefore, be some limitations placed on what the wealthy local dis-
trict can raise and spend itself. Most probably, this would require
the elimination of the local property tax and a provision for some
form of state-wide revenue. Without such limitations on local au-
tonomy, there will be constant pressure from the wealthy districts
to hold down state-wide expenditures that benefit the poor at the
expense of the rich.
CONCLUSION
The times may not be right for a revision of public education
23 Kurland, supra note 10, at 58.
24 Cf. Bigart, Black Believes Warren Phrase Slowed Integration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1968, at 1, col. 2; Herbers, School Segrepqtign a Live Issue 15 Years .4fitr High Court
Ban, id. May 17, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
25 See his discussion at 199-206,
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finance. The Court has thus far avoided a detailed confrontation
with the issue of whether school finance laws violate equal protec-
tion by affirming per curiam an Illinois district court's dismissal of
a suit seeking to void that state's school finance statute.26 It may
be that President Nixon's election in a campaign filled with criticism
of the "liberal" views of the Court bodes ill for an extension of the
principle that geography and wealth are constitutionally irrelevant
when one utilizes important public institutions. The Court may act
cautiously and its ideological composition may become more conser-
vative.
Moreover, it is possible that achieving equality in public educa-
tion expenditure would ultimately not be beneficial. In the event of a
Supreme Court decision requiring equality in public education, fierce
resistance to the egalitarian approach to school finance might lead to
the abandonment of the public school system by the affluent. Such a
possibility has not deterred the Court from moving vigorously against
"separate but equal" in the South. But in the school finance area it is
possible that, if the affluent abandon the system, a new and strong
lobby with a vested interest against public school taxes will emerge.
Public schools would become the exclusive preserve of the poor. The
result would be further deterioration in education. In short, the urban-
suburban inequality would become public-private.
If these observations are accurate-and it is not entirely clear that
they are-supporters of equality in public school finance may have to
give greater attention to ridding the system of its unattractive, bureau-
cratic features which some attribute to the monopolistic position in
which most school boards and the state find themselves. If choice and
competition were provided the taxpayer, it might be possible for us to
have both the public school system and some measure of equality. But,
whatever the structure for education, it is clear that a system so arbi-
trary and inequitable as is education today cannot remain intact for
long.
William B. Gould*
26 McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1958, University of
Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell University. Member of Citizens' Advisory Council to
the Michigan Governor's Commission on Educational Reform.
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